Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs | Zendy

Jason R. Barro | Zendy; Robert J. Barro | Zendy

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Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs

Author(s) -

Jason R. Barro,

Robert J. Barro

Publication year - 1990

Publication title -

journal of labor economics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 8.184

H-Index - 109

eISSN - 1537-5307

pISSN - 0734-306X

DOI - 10.1086/298230

Subject(s) - executive compensation , stock (firearms) , business , turnover , logit , economics , labour economics , demographic economics , accounting , econometrics , finance , corporate governance , management , mechanical engineering , engineering

A new data set covers chief executive officers (CEOs) of large commercial banks over the period 1982-87. For newly hired CEOs, the elasticity of pay with respect to assets is about one-third. For continuing CEOs, the change in compensation depends on performance, as measured by stock and accounting returns. The sensitivity of pay to performance diminishes with experience, but the returns are not filtered for peer-group returns. Logit regressions relate the probability of CEO departure to age and performance, as measured by stock returns filtered for peer-group returns; CEO experience does not influence this relationship.

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