Collective Bargaining Laws, Threat Effects, and the Determination of Police Compensation | Zendy

Casey Ichniowski | Zendy; Richard B. Freeman | Zendy; Harrison Lauer | Zendy

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Collective Bargaining Laws, Threat Effects, and the Determination of Police Compensation

Author(s) -

Casey Ichniowski,

Richard B. Freeman,

Harrison Lauer

Publication year - 1989

Publication title -

journal of labor economics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 8.184

H-Index - 109

eISSN - 1537-5307

pISSN - 0734-306X

DOI - 10.1086/298205

Subject(s) - compensation (psychology) , collective bargaining , labour economics , bargaining power , state (computer science) , economics , closure (psychology) , business , law , political science , market economy , microeconomics , psychology , algorithm , computer science , psychoanalysis

This article demonstrates that state collective bargaining laws are important determinants of union and nonunion public employee compensation. State laws that provide stronger bargaining rights and ensure closure to the bargaining process increase the direct effect of police unions on compensation. Moreover, indirect threat effects on the pay of nonunion police also increase with stronger bargaining laws. In each law category investigated, nonunion police receive most of the compensation premium enjoyed by unionized police. Previous studies that have not adequately controlled for these effects of bargaining laws have therefore underestimated the full effect of public-sector unions on compensation.

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