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Truth and Inquiry: A reply to David Bridges
Author(s) -
Hufton Neil
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
british educational research journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.171
H-Index - 89
eISSN - 1469-3518
pISSN - 0141-1926
DOI - 10.1080/01411920124820
Subject(s) - epistemology , confusion , attribution , order (exchange) , sociology , philosophy , psychology , social psychology , psychoanalysis , finance , economics
A distinction is drawn between factual propositions and theoretical propositions. It is accepted that truth can be attributed to factual propositions, but argued that the unproblematic attribution of truth may be restricted to these. For theoretical propositions generally—including those held to be grounded in empirical educational research—it is not clear either how truth is to be attributed, or that any benefit flows from making the attempt. Nor do we need, as Bridges asserts, to know truth, in order to lie, or to query false belief in others. Haack's explanation of what is involved in having rigorous belief is sketched and offered as a basis for guiding the conduct of inquiry, whilst assisting with problems of confusion, methodological misdirection, and doctrinaire exclusivity arising from insisting on truth as a goal, or criterion of inquiry.