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Social Dilemmas
Author(s) -
Dawes Robyn M.,
Messick David M.
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
international journal of psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.75
H-Index - 62
eISSN - 1464-066X
pISSN - 0020-7594
DOI - 10.1080/002075900399402
Subject(s) - social dilemma , psychology , framing (construction) , social psychology , social identity theory , dilemma , social group , collective identity , identity (music) , epistemology , political science , law , philosophy , physics , structural engineering , politics , acoustics , engineering
In social dilemma situations, each individual always receives a higher payoff for defecting than for cooperating, but all are better off if all cooperate than if all defect. Often, however, people in social dilemmas attend more to the group's payoffs than to their own, either automatically or to behave “appropriately.” But whereas social identity elicits cooperative behaviour in dilemmas, it is generally only for the benefit of an “in‐group.” Dilemmas between groups (requiring self‐sacrificial behaviour within) are often the most extreme. Consequently, the framing and manipulation of group identity is critical to cooperation rate as demonstrated by careful laboratory experimentation.