Open AccessDynamic climate clubs: On the effectiveness of incentives in global climate agreements
Author(s) -
William D. Nordhaus
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
proceedings of the national academy of sciences of the united states of america
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 5.011
H-Index - 771
eISSN - 1091-6490
pISSN - 0027-8424
DOI - 10.1073/pnas.2109988118
Subject(s) - sanctions , incentive , club , climate change , economics , element (criminal law) , global climate , global warming , natural resource economics , business , microeconomics , political science , ecology , medicine , biology , law , anatomy
Significance Global agreements on climate change date back to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, yet little substantial coordinated abatement has taken place. Free riding is a major hurdle in the solution of global externalities and is at the heart of the international failures to deal with climate change. The present analysis presents a dynamic model of a climate club and shows that club incentives through tariff penalties and rapid decarbonizing technological change can achieve the international objectives of governments.