
The Medusa effect reveals levels of mind perception in pictures
Author(s) -
Paris Will,
Elle Merritt,
Rob Jenkins,
Alan Kingstone
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
proceedings of the national academy of sciences of the united states of america
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 5.011
H-Index - 771
eISSN - 1091-6490
pISSN - 0027-8424
DOI - 10.1073/pnas.2106640118
Subject(s) - perception , stimulus (psychology) , psychology , cognitive psychology , attribution , abstraction , social psychology , communication , epistemology , philosophy , neuroscience
Significance Differential treatment of animate and inanimate objects often hinges on mind perception—the attribution of mental states to others. It has already been established that pictures of animate objects can elicit mind perception, albeit at reduced intensity. However, this loss of intensity is assumed to reflect an impoverishment of a rich stimulus, such as the projection of a living being into a static picture plane. The current study overturns this assumption by showing that “pure” abstraction can reduce mind perception independent of stimulus richness. Depicting things with minds raises ethical questions that have not been recognized previously. As these questions emerge from representational structure rather than representational content, they are unlikely to be quashed by improvements in image quality.