Open AccessCryptanalysis of a generic one‐round key exchange protocol with strong security
Author(s) -
Yang Zheng,
Lai Junyu,
Li Guoyuan
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
iet information security
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.308
H-Index - 34
eISSN - 1751-8717
pISSN - 1751-8709
DOI - 10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0055
Subject(s) - key exchange , cryptanalysis , computer science , secrecy , key (lock) , public key cryptography , forward secrecy , scheme (mathematics) , computer security , cryptography , protocol (science) , theoretical computer science , mathematics , encryption , medicine , mathematical analysis , alternative medicine , pathology
In Public‐Key Cryptography (PKC) 2015, Bergsma et al . introduced an interesting one‐round key exchange protocol (which will be referred to as BJS scheme) with strong security in particular for perfect forward secrecy (PFS). In this study, the authors unveil a PFS attack against the BJS scheme. This would simply invalidate its security proof. An improvement is proposed to fix the problem of the BJS scheme with minimum changes.