Open AccessSignORKE: improving pairing‐based one‐round key exchange without random oracles
Author(s) -
Yang Zheng,
Lai Junyu,
Liu Wanping,
Liu Chao,
Luo Song
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
iet information security
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.308
H-Index - 34
eISSN - 1751-8717
pISSN - 1751-8709
DOI - 10.1049/iet-ifs.2016.0320
Subject(s) - computer science , pairing , key (lock) , authenticated key exchange , theoretical computer science , signature (topology) , ephemeral key , construct (python library) , key exchange , consistency (knowledge bases) , public key cryptography , protocol (science) , session key , computer security , random oracle , public key infrastructure , cryptography , mathematics , computer network , encryption , artificial intelligence , medicine , physics , superconductivity , geometry , alternative medicine , pathology , quantum mechanics
The study presents a new efficient way to construct the one‐round key exchange (ORKE) without random oracles based on standard hard complexity assumptions. The authors propose a (PKI‐based) ORKE protocol which is more computational efficient than existing pairing‐based ORKE protocols without random oracles in the post‐specified peer setting. The core idea of this construction is to integrate the consistency check of the ephemeral public key and the verification of the signature into the session key generation. This enables us to roughly save two pairing operations. The authors just call this kind of scheme that is deeply composed by signature and one‐round key exchange as SignORKE. The authors’ protocol is shown to be secure in a variant of the Canetti–Krawczyk security model which covers the majority of state‐of‐the‐art active attacks.