Open AccessUnified security model of authenticated key exchange with specific adversarial capabilities
Author(s) -
Wen Weiqiang,
Wang Libin,
Pan Jiaxin
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
iet information security
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.308
H-Index - 34
eISSN - 1751-8717
pISSN - 1751-8709
DOI - 10.1049/iet-ifs.2014.0234
Subject(s) - computer science , authenticated key exchange , random oracle , mathematical proof , computer security model , key exchange , provable security , adversarial system , protocol (science) , computer security , key (lock) , theoretical computer science , oracle , usability , public key cryptography , cryptography , mathematics , encryption , artificial intelligence , medicine , geometry , pathology , human–computer interaction , alternative medicine , software engineering
The most widely accepted models in the security proofs of authenticated key exchange protocols are the Canetti–Krawczyk (CK) and extended CK models that admit different adversarial queries with ambiguities and incomparable strength. It is desirable to incorporate specific and powerful adversarial queries into a single unified security model and establish a more practical oriented security notion. Concerning the security of one‐round implicitly authenticated Diffie–Hellman (DH) key exchange protocols, the authors present a unified security model that has many advantages over the previous ones. In the model, a system environment is set up, all of adversarial queries are practically interpreted and definitely characterised through physical environment, and some rigorous rules of secret leakage are also specified. To demonstrate usability of their model, a new protocol based on the OAKE protocol is proposed, which satisfies the presented strong security notion and attains high efficiency. The protocol is proven secure in random oracle model under gap DH assumption.