Open AccessReview on GPS spoofing‐based time synchronisation attack on power system
Author(s) -
Zhang Heng,
Peng Shurong,
Liu Liang,
Su Sheng,
Cao Yijia
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
iet generation, transmission and distribution
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.92
H-Index - 110
eISSN - 1751-8695
pISSN - 1751-8687
DOI - 10.1049/iet-gtd.2020.0253
Subject(s) - spoofing attack , global positioning system , computer science , firewall (physics) , electric power system , computer security , real time computing , power (physics) , telecommunications , physics , schwarzschild radius , classical mechanics , quantum mechanics , gravitation , charged black hole
Power utilities implement cyber‐security defence with a philosophy of defence in‐depth. Firewall and air‐gapped systems are widely used to harden cybersecurity defence of critical power system infrastructure. However, cyber‐attack, such as global positioning system (GPS) spoofing, that can compromise the air‐gap system has not been investigated thoroughly. As a geographically dispersed cyber‐physical system, the power system relies heavily on the GPS to keep time synchronisation of different parts with high precision. GPS spoofing‐based time synchronisation attack (TSA) could induce disorder in time synchronisation, and negatively impact or even disable monitoring and control function of the power system via their operation mechanism. The principles of GPS‐based time synchronisation and GPS spoofing‐based TSA are introduced. Time synchronisation and operation mechanism of typical monitoring and control systems of the power systems are analysed. Thereafter, the consequences of TSA against these systems are analysed. Various techniques that can be used to defend against TSA are depicted and their performances are analysed.