Open AccessBargaining‐based cooperative game among multi‐aggregators with overlapping consumers in incentive‐based demand response
Author(s) -
Zheng Shunlin,
Sun Yi,
Li Bin,
Qi Bing,
Shi Kun,
Li Yuanfei,
Du Yi
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
iet generation, transmission and distribution
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.92
H-Index - 110
eISSN - 1751-8695
pISSN - 1751-8687
DOI - 10.1049/iet-gtd.2019.1084
Subject(s) - bargaining problem , flexibility (engineering) , computer science , incentive , microeconomics , compensation (psychology) , sequential game , nash equilibrium , game theory , best response , demand response , non cooperative game , set (abstract data type) , economics , mathematical optimization , electricity , mathematics , psychology , programming language , management , psychoanalysis , electrical engineering , engineering
To solve irreconcilable pricing strategies of multi‐aggregators when overlapping consumers join in the incentive‐based demand response programs, this study proposes a bargaining‐based cooperative game among multi‐aggregators with overlapping consumers. In the game, bargaining set is designed as an unbiased agreement which benefits all players in the game. Nash equilibrium (NE) of the proposed bargaining‐based cooperative game is proved to exist uniquely, and the authors propose a hierarchical comparison algorithm to find the NE. In addition, the authors also propose a diverse compensation price (DCP) trading model between electric utility company (EUC) and demand response aggregators to save the cost of EUC and to improve the flexibility of trading. Simulation results not only verify the validity of the bargaining‐based cooperative game and the hierarchical comparison algorithm but also testify the merits of DCP trading model in saving the compensation cost of EUC.