Open AccessSimultaneous consideration of the balancing market and day‐ahead market in Stackelberg game for flexiramp procurement problem in the presence of the wind farms and a DR aggregator
Author(s) -
Kaheh Zohreh,
Kazemzadeh Reza Baradaran,
SheikhElEslami Mohammad Kazem
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
iet generation, transmission and distribution
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.92
H-Index - 110
eISSN - 1751-8695
pISSN - 1751-8687
DOI - 10.1049/iet-gtd.2018.6666
Subject(s) - news aggregator , stackelberg competition , karush–kuhn–tucker conditions , bidding , procurement , context (archaeology) , demand response , computer science , operations research , electricity market , mathematical optimization , microeconomics , economics , electricity , engineering , mathematics , paleontology , management , electrical engineering , biology , operating system
This study presents a cooperative bidding model for energy, reserve, and flexiramp providing by a group of suppliers. Procurement problems in electricity markets have been analysed through the Stackelberg concept and modelled via bi‐level programming. However, previous bi‐level models have captured the game only in the context of the day‐ahead or real‐time market. In this study, a stochastic two‐stage multi‐objective bi‐level model for procurement problem in the day‐ahead and balancing markets is proposed; in which the Stackelberg game is simultaneously considered in these markets. In each stage of the proposed model, multiple decision‐makers including conventional and wind generating units as well as a demand response (DR) aggregator act as leaders, and independent system operator (ISO) acts as a follower. The presented model for DR aggregator determines some important parameters dynamically considering the hourly locational marginal prices and the behaviour of the small‐size consumers. To solve the model, two reformulation schemes are presented: (i) a Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) method with some linearisation approaches and (ii) a fuzzy max–min technique. The proposed model is applied to the 24‐bus IEEE test system to demonstrate the effects of the Stackelberg game in balancing market on the day‐ahead market's equilibriums and benefits of implementing the proposed model in electricity markets.