Open AccessSemantic analysis framework for protecting the power grid against monitoring‐control attacks
Author(s) -
Wang Jiankang,
Constante Gonzalo,
Moya Christian,
Hong Junho
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
iet cyber‐physical systems: theory and applications
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.308
H-Index - 7
ISSN - 2398-3396
DOI - 10.1049/iet-cps.2019.0026
Subject(s) - computer science , intrusion detection system , grid , computer security , complement (music) , control (management) , power grid , intrusion , computer network , distributed computing , power (physics) , embedded system , artificial intelligence , biochemistry , chemistry , geometry , mathematics , physics , geochemistry , quantum mechanics , complementation , gene , phenotype , geology
The pervasive use of heterogeneous and non‐proprietary information and communication technology exposes the power grid to cyber‐attacks. In particular, monitoring‐control attacks (MCA), which manipulate control decisions by fabricating measurements, are highly threatening, because MCA are difficult to detect and can coordinately inflict severe consequences at a large scale. To defend against MCA, a semantic analysis framework is proposed in complement to direct‐setting intrusion detection. The proposed framework has the advantages of promising runtime and detection performance. The performance of the proposed framework is evaluated under different attack scenarios and compared with a direct‐settings intrusion detection systems using a 6‐bus test system and the New‐England 39‐bus test system.