Open AccessGPS spoofing effect on phase angle monitoring and control in a real‐time digital simulator‐based hardware‐in‐the‐loop environment
Author(s) -
Konstantinou Charalambos,
Sazos Marios,
Musleh Ahmed S.,
Keliris Anastasis,
AlDurra Ahmed,
Maniatakos Michail
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
iet cyber‐physical systems: theory and applications
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.308
H-Index - 7
ISSN - 2398-3396
DOI - 10.1049/iet-cps.2017.0033
Subject(s) - global positioning system , testbed , real time digital simulator , real time computing , spoofing attack , iec 61850 , hardware in the loop simulation , computer science , phasor , embedded system , electric power system , simulation , engineering , power (physics) , automation , computer network , telecommunications , physics , quantum mechanics , mechanical engineering
In recent years, cyber‐physical system (CPS) applications have been extensively utilised in the electric power grid to enable wide‐area protection, control, and monitoring of power systems. Many of these applications in a smart grid CPS depend on reliable time synchronisation. For example, synchrophasor data from geographically distributed phasor measurement units (PMU) utilise global positioning system (GPS) for precise timing. However, these units are exposed to GPS time spoofing attacks that can lead to inaccurate monitoring and trigger unnecessary, and possibly destabilising, remedial control actions. The authors develop an end‐to‐end case study demonstrating the effect of GPS spoofing attacks on the phase angle monitoring and control functions of a PMU‐based load shedding scheme. The evaluation of authors attack strategy is performed in a hardware‐in‐the‐loop real‐time digital simulator‐enabled power system testbed.