Open AccessInterference pricing in 5G ultra‐dense small cell networks: a Stackelberg game approach
Author(s) -
Wang Zeng,
Hu Bo,
Wang Xin,
Chen Shanzhi
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
iet communications
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.355
H-Index - 62
eISSN - 1751-8636
pISSN - 1751-8628
DOI - 10.1049/iet-com.2016.0116
Subject(s) - stackelberg competition , macrocell , computer science , interference (communication) , base station , power control , transmitter power output , computer network , channel (broadcasting) , transmission (telecommunications) , channel allocation schemes , game theory , mathematical optimization , wireless , transmitter , power (physics) , telecommunications , mathematics , physics , mathematical economics , quantum mechanics
Being one of core characteristics for 5G cellular networks, ultra‐dense small cell network is an effective approach to reuse the spectrum and achieve high data rate transmission in the wireless communication networks. However, because of sharing the spectrum resources, the interference problem among the macrocell base stations (MBS) and the small cell base stations (SCBSs) is hard to address. In this study, the authors model the scenario as a Stackelberg game, where the MBS act as the leader and all SCBSs act as followers. In the game, the MBS set its interference penalty price first, based on the prices the MBS then determines its channel allocation schemes to all SCBSs. Observing the interference penalty price and the amount of allocated channels performed by the MBS, each SCBS then determines its transmit power to achieve its optimal utility. Because of the first‐move advantage, the MBS is able to predict the reactions of each SCBS and make optimal strategies. Simulation results show the correctness of the analysis and the significant benefits when the power control and channel allocation are jointly considered in the proposed schemes.