z-logo
open-access-imgOpen Access
Cryptanalysis of a Key Exchange Protocol Based on Commuting Matrices
Author(s) -
Jia Jianwei,
Liu Jinhui,
Zhang Huanguo
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
chinese journal of electronics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.267
H-Index - 25
eISSN - 2075-5597
pISSN - 1022-4653
DOI - 10.1049/cje.2017.08.013
Subject(s) - cryptanalysis , key exchange , key (lock) , protocol (science) , computer science , theoretical computer science , computer security , cryptography , public key cryptography , medicine , encryption , alternative medicine , pathology
A key exchange protocol is considered unsafe. The scheme is based on a set of m commuting square singular matrices of dimension n x n over a finite field, and its security is claimed to rely on the hardness of the matrix version discrete logarithm problem. However, the proposal's design allows for a clean attack strategy. We show that the key exchange protocol is vulnerable to a linear algebra attack which only requires polynomial time to obtain the equivalent keys for all given public keys. We conduct a detailed analysis on the attack method and provide some improved suggestions on the key exchange protocol based on commuting matrices.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.
Having issues? You can contact us here