Open AccessA Differential Fault Analysis Attack Against the Light Weight PRINTcipher
Author(s) -
Zhang Wenying
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
chinese journal of electronics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.267
H-Index - 25
eISSN - 2075-5597
pISSN - 1022-4653
DOI - 10.1049/cje.2016.10.002
Subject(s) - block cipher , notice , permutation (music) , computer science , key (lock) , differential (mechanical device) , block (permutation group theory) , property (philosophy) , computer security , fault (geology) , algorithm , arithmetic , mathematics , cryptography , engineering , geology , combinatorics , physics , seismology , philosophy , epistemology , political science , acoustics , law , aerospace engineering
We present two fault injection attacks against the IC‐Printing block cipher (PRINTcipher). The basic idea of our attack is to notice the property that by using some couples of input difference and output difference, the attacker can determine the permutation control key. To recover the permutation control key, one needs to inject at least 4 faults. It is needed at least 15 faults to reveal the whole key.