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Intervención Estatal para Proteger Especies Amenazadas: Porque la Historia y la Mala Suerte son Importantes
Author(s) -
Bulte Erwin H.,
Van Kooten G. Cornelis
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
conservation biology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.2
H-Index - 222
eISSN - 1523-1739
pISSN - 0888-8892
DOI - 10.1046/j.1523-1739.2001.00038.x
Subject(s) - poaching , endangered species , enforcement , wildlife , business , intervention (counseling) , cites , geography , natural resource economics , ecology , biology , economics , habitat , psychology , psychiatry
Illegal exploitation threatens the survival of many species, and anti‐poaching legislation (“protection on paper”) does not protect species. State enforcement is needed to support and supplement the formal status of endangered species, but state enforcement can be a source of instability leading to the demise of species if ad hoc rules are followed blindly. We demonstrate this with a model of poaching, wildlife, and government wildlife enforcement, but our findings apply more generally. Crucial assumptions of the dynamic model are that both poaching and enforcement effort increase or decrease whenever poaching effort and enforcement are relatively profitable or unprofitable activities, respectively. We found that multiple steady states may characterize the system's equilibrium. Depending on initial populations, the initial extent of state involvement, and random events, animal populations may be severely depleted or unexpectedly built up during transition phases. Our findings highlight the importance of history and luck in protecting endangered species.