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AGAINST LEWIS's NEW THEORY OF CAUSATION: A STORY WITH THREE MORALS
Author(s) -
Strevens Michael
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1046/j.1468-0114.2003.00182.x
Subject(s) - causation , counterfactual thinking , relation (database) , argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , counterexample , individuation , philosophy , event (particle physics) , psychology , mathematics , psychoanalysis , computer science , biochemistry , chemistry , discrete mathematics , database , physics , quantum mechanics
Abstract: A recent paper by David Lewis, “Causation as Influence”, provides a new theory of causation. This paper presents an argument against the theory, using a series of counterexamples that are, I think, of independent interest to philosophers of causation. I argue that (a) the relation asserted by a claim of the form “ C was a cause of E ” is distinct from the relation of causal influence, (b) the former relation depends very much, contra Lewis, on the individuation conditions for the event E , and (c) Lewis's account is unsatisfactory as an analysis of either kind of relation. The counterexamples presented in this paper provide, I suggest, some insight into the reasons for the failure of counterfactual accounts of causal relations.