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Species concepts: the basis for controversy and reconciliation
Author(s) -
Ghiselin Michael T
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
fish and fisheries
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.747
H-Index - 109
eISSN - 1467-2979
pISSN - 1467-2960
DOI - 10.1046/j.1467-2979.2002.00084.x
Subject(s) - taxon , epistemology , pluralism (philosophy) , natural (archaeology) , similarity (geometry) , taxonomy (biology) , ecology , natural law , biology , evolutionary biology , computer science , philosophy , artificial intelligence , paleontology , image (mathematics)
Some of the disputes about species concepts can be resolved through clarification of the conceptual issues. Others are intractable because incompatible preferences are being optimized. According to the current biological consensus species (taxa) are populations rendered cohesive by sex. The philosophical consensus has it that the species and other categories are (abstract) classes, whereas particular species and other taxa are (concrete) individuals (in the ontological sense). Natural kinds are classes that have the properties they do because of laws of nature. Individuals such as species and clades owe their properties to history, not laws of nature; they are not kinds at all and calling them natural kinds is, therefore, grossly misleading. Having the species of taxonomy be equivalent to the species of evolutionary theory facilitates the integration of history and laws of nature within biology. Efforts to define the species category on the basis of similarity create misleading impressions about the laws and mechanisms of speciation processes. A diversity of incompatible species concepts (pluralism) is undesirable because the various kinds of units that are called ‘species’ differ with respect to the underlying laws of nature that make them natural kinds.