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Meta‐analysis: the glass eye of evidence‐based practice?
Author(s) -
Gregson P. Rodger W.,
Meal Andrew G.,
Avis Mark
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
nursing inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.66
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1440-1800
pISSN - 1320-7881
DOI - 10.1046/j.1440-1800.2002.00129.x
Subject(s) - coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) , epistemology , meta analysis , perception , realism , psychology , cognitive psychology , computer science , philosophy , mathematics , medicine , statistics
Meta‐analysis: the glass eye of evidence‐based practice? Meta‐analysis was developed as a technique for combining the results of many different quantitative studies: it is often used to produce quantitative estimates of causal relations and/or association between variables. Meta‐analysis is sometimes regarded as a central component of evidence‐based practice. We draw attention to an incompatibility in the epistemology and methods of reasoning in quantitative meta‐analysis and the epistemology and reasoning implicit in expert practice. We argue that this may be because the common perception of meta‐analysis appeals to truth as correspondence; we suggest that rejecting the naïve realism that underpins truth as correspondence allows meta‐analysis to be understood in terms of truth as coherence. We can then develop an account of meta‐analysis that does not depend upon reduction to a mathematical procedure but is an attempt to maximise coherence in beliefs about what works that is consistent with clinical reasoning in expert practice.