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Certainty, probability and abduction: why we should look to C.S. Peirce rather than Gödel for a theory of clinical reasoning
Author(s) -
Upshur Ross
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
journal of evaluation in clinical practice
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.737
H-Index - 73
eISSN - 1365-2753
pISSN - 1356-1294
DOI - 10.1046/j.1365-2753.1997.00004.x
Subject(s) - abductive reasoning , certainty , inductive reasoning , inference , deductive reasoning , epistemology , philosophy , psychology , medicine
This paper argues that Gödel's proof does not provide the appropriate conceptual basis on which to counter the claims of evidence‐based medicine. The nature of, and differences between, deductive, inductive and abductive inference are briefly surveyed. The work of the American logician C.S. Peirce is introduced as a possible framework for a theory of clinical reasoning which can ground the claims of both evidence‐based medicine and its critics.