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Campaign Finance Laws and the Competition for Spending in Gubernatorial Elections *
Author(s) -
Bardwell Kedron
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
social science quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.482
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1540-6237
pISSN - 0038-4941
DOI - 10.1046/j.0038-4941.2003.08404003.x
Subject(s) - liberian dollar , governor , economics , campaign finance , competition (biology) , public spending , state (computer science) , public finance , diversity (politics) , political science , finance , law , politics , macroeconomics , ecology , physics , algorithm , biology , computer science , thermodynamics
Objective. The diversity of campaign finance laws in the U.S. states allows the effects of these reforms to be measured. I investigate the impact of contribution limits and public financing on campaign spending in gubernatorial elections. Methods. I conduct a multivariate regression analysis of general election spending in races for governor from 1980 to 2000. I analyze levels of spending per voter, as well as challengers' share of total spending. Results. State contribution limits do not hold down overall spending. Candidate acceptance of public funding and spending limits reduces spending by incumbent governors more than it reduces that of challengers. As for challengers' share of spending, I find that public funding programs improve challengers' ability to match incumbents' spending dollar for dollar. Conclusions. State programs that offer public funding to candidates effectively favor challengers. This points to the potential of these reforms to make federal elections more competitive.