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Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in England and Wales
Author(s) -
Moorhead Richard,
Sherr Avrom,
Paterson Alan
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
law and society review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.867
H-Index - 74
eISSN - 1540-5893
pISSN - 0023-9216
DOI - 10.1046/j.0023-9216.2003.03704003.x
Subject(s) - cartel , quality (philosophy) , trustworthiness , law and economics , subject (documents) , law , sociology , political science , business , economics , epistemology , incentive , computer science , microeconomics , psychology , social psychology , philosophy , library science
Professions are granted a form of cartel that enables them to charge more than would arise in a free market on the assumption that they provide better quality and are more trustworthy than free‐market actors would be. The theoretical assumption that lawyers are more competent than nonlawyers has given rise to significant formal protections for professions in many jurisdictions. Two testable propositions arise from this theory: (1) lawyers cost more, but (2) they deliver higher quality. It is a testing of these twin propositions that is the subject of this article, with well‐triangulated data and a deeper understanding of the theoretical differences between lawyers and nonlawyers.