Interpreting Art, Interpreting Literature

This paper compares and analyzes two of the recent accounts of the ontological status of works of art. Both demand attention not only because they represent some of the most thorough analyses of the problem, but because they have far‐reaching practical consequences for the way in which we (should) interact with works of art, and thus with works of literature. Jerrold Levinson has originally advanced his views in a 1980 essay, “What a Musical Work Is”, revising them in two subsequent versions. Gregory Currie's theory, conceived in part as a response to Levinson's proposals, is outlined in An Ontology of Art (1989), mainly in the third chapter, “Art Works As Action Types”. Although both accounts have their advantages, I argue that conceptual, intuitive, and pragmatic evidence points strongly in favour of accepting only one of them. I begin with a critique of Currie's theses, followed by a review of Levinson's proposals, which leads me to the formulation of a theory of artworks. In the concluding part of my article I apply these findings to the specifically literary‐critical context, arguing for a distinction between literary interpretations and textual readings.