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A socially optimum pricing policy for a public water agency
Author(s) -
Brown Gardner,
McGuire C. B.
Publication year - 1967
Publication title -
water resources research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.863
H-Index - 217
eISSN - 1944-7973
pISSN - 0043-1397
DOI - 10.1029/wr003i001p00033
Subject(s) - groundwater , agency (philosophy) , lift (data mining) , irrigation , surface water , irrigation district , environmental science , economics , water resource management , environmental economics , natural resource economics , business , environmental engineering , engineering , computer science , geotechnical engineering , biology , ecology , philosophy , epistemology , data mining
A simple model is developed for determining the socially optimum price to charge locationally differentiated irrigation districts for both surface and groundwater supplies. Steady‐state conditions are assumed for groundwater conditions and water demand functions. A divergence between social and private optimums arises from the existence of unadjudicated rights to groundwater supplies. The social optimum can be achieved by an appropriately conceived taxing policy. Water prices, tax rates, and optimum lift levels are estimated for seven irrigation districts, members of a master water agency.