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A comparative analysis of leveraged recapitalization versus leveraged buyout as a takeover defense
Author(s) -
Bae Sung C.,
Simet Daniel P.
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
review of financial economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.347
H-Index - 41
eISSN - 1873-5924
pISSN - 1058-3300
DOI - 10.1016/s1058-3300(99)80151-7
Subject(s) - leveraged buyout , recapitalization , free cash flow , business , shareholder , agency cost , monetary economics , cash flow , private equity , agency (philosophy) , finance , accounting , economics , financial system , corporate governance , philosophy , epistemology
Two types of defensive scheme—leveraged buyout (LBO) and leveraged recapitalization (LR)—are examined. In particular, this article examines (1) whether the two similar defensive tactics affect stockholder returns differently and (2) what firm attributes are associated with stockholder gains in LBO and LR announcements. This study finds that stocks of both LBO and LR firms, on average, exhibit significant positive abnormal returns during the announcement period, but that the latter experience substantially smaller returns than the former. This study further finds that while mitigation of agency problems associated with a firm's free cash flow is present for both LR and LBO firms, it is more pronounced for the LBO firms. These results provide evidence that a firm with higher free cash flow could benefit a greater reduction of agency costs by going private through a LBO plan than by remaining public through a LR plan.