Premium
Bank levy and bank risk‐taking
Author(s) -
Diemer Michael
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
review of financial economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.347
H-Index - 41
eISSN - 1873-5924
pISSN - 1058-3300
DOI - 10.1016/j.rfe.2017.06.001
Subject(s) - debt , asset (computer security) , business , contingent liability , economics , finance , financial system , monetary economics , computer security , computer science
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, several countries implemented a bank levy. This paper studies the impact of different types of bank levies on the risk‐taking behaviour of banks competing in the market for secured or unsecured debt à la Hotelling. We differentiate between three types of bank levies: a levy on secured liabilities, a levy on unsecured liabilities and a levy on risk‐weighted assets. Banks collect funds and invest in either a prudent or a gambling asset. We find that a levy on secured and unsecured liabilities can prevent banks from investing in the gambling asset. A levy on risk‐weighted assets also induces banks to behave more prudently. Such a levy is even more effective than a levy on liabilities if banks are well‐capitalized. Finally, a guarantee on debt makes a bank levy more effective.