Open AccessDynamic communication mechanism design
Author(s) -
Ryuji Sano
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
social choice and welfare
Language(s) - Uncategorized
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.504
H-Index - 52
eISSN - 1432-217X
pISSN - 0176-1714
DOI - 10.1007/s00355-021-01309-y
Subject(s) - incentive compatibility , common value auction , mechanism design , incentive , mechanism (biology) , monotone polygon , microeconomics , public finance , strategic dominance , computer science , ex ante , economics , mathematical economics , mathematical optimization , mathematics , philosophy , geometry , epistemology , macroeconomics
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