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Narrativity and non‐Narrativity
Author(s) -
Strawson Galen
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
wiley interdisciplinary reviews: cognitive science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.526
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1939-5086
pISSN - 1939-5078
DOI - 10.1002/wcs.92
Subject(s) - narrativity , narrative , possession (linguistics) , narrative identity , identity (music) , impromptu , narrative psychology , normative , telepathy , narratology , constitution , sociology , psychoanalysis , psychology , aesthetics , literature , epistemology , philosophy , narrative criticism , narrative inquiry , art , law , linguistics , computer science , political science , medicine , alternative medicine , pathology , programming language
I argue against two popular claims. The first is a descriptive, empirical claim about the nature of ordinary human experience which I call the psychological Narrativity thesis (PNT). According to PNT, ‘each of us constructs and lives a “narrative” … this narrative is us, our identities’ (Sacks O. The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat . London: Duckworth; 1985, 110). The second is a normative, ethical claim which I call the ethical Narrativity thesis (ENT). According to ENT, we ought to live our lives narratively, or as a story: a ‘basic condition of making sense of ourselves is that we grasp our lives in a narrative ’ and have an understanding of our lives ‘as an unfolding story’ (Taylor C. Sources of the Self . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1989, 47–52). On this view a person ‘creates his identity (only) by forming an autobiographical narrative—a story of his life’, and must be in possession of a full and ‘explicit narrative (of his life) to develop fully as a person’ (Schechtman M. The Constitution of Selves . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; 1996, 93. WIREs Cogn Sci 2010 1 775–780 This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Metaphysics