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Introspection
Author(s) -
Engelbert Mark,
Carruthers Peter
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
wiley interdisciplinary reviews: cognitive science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.526
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1939-5086
pISSN - 1939-5078
DOI - 10.1002/wcs.4
Subject(s) - introspection , attribution , psychology , sort , cognition , epistemology , self knowledge , cognitive psychology , social psychology , computer science , philosophy , neuroscience , information retrieval
Two main questions about introspection are addressed: whether it exists, and whether it is a reliable source of self‐knowledge. Most philosophers have assumed that the answers to both questions are positive, whereas an increasing number of cognitive scientists take the view that introspection is either nonexistent (with self‐attributions of mental states being made on the same sort of interpretative basis as attributions of mental states to other people) or unreliable. A number of different models of self‐knowledge are discussed, and the evidence bearing on the existence and reliability of introspection is reviewed. New experiments are required to tease apart some of the alternatives. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Consciousness