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Modularity and mental architecture
Author(s) -
Robbins Philip
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
wiley interdisciplinary reviews: cognitive science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.526
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1939-5086
pISSN - 1939-5078
DOI - 10.1002/wcs.1255
Subject(s) - modularity (biology) , cognitive architecture , skepticism , cognitive science , architecture , cognition , argument (complex analysis) , computer science , perception , psychology , cognitive psychology , epistemology , neuroscience , biology , philosophy , art , biochemistry , genetics , visual arts
Debates about the modularity of cognitive architecture have been ongoing for at least the past three decades, since the publication of Fodor's landmark book The Modularity of Mind . According to Fodor, modularity is essentially tied to informational encapsulation, and as such is only found in the relatively low‐level cognitive systems responsible for perception and language. According to Fodor's critics in the evolutionary psychology camp, modularity simply reflects the fine‐grained functional specialization dictated by natural selection, and it characterizes virtually all aspects of cognitive architecture, including high‐level systems for judgment, decision making, and reasoning. Though both of these perspectives on modularity have garnered support, the current state of evidence and argument suggests that a broader skepticism about modularity may be warranted. WIREs Cogn Sci 2013, 4:641–649. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1255 This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science