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Embodied cognition
Author(s) -
Foglia Lucia,
Wilson Robert A.
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
wiley interdisciplinary reviews: cognitive science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.526
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1939-5086
pISSN - 1939-5078
DOI - 10.1002/wcs.1226
Subject(s) - embodied cognition , cognition , cognitive science , philosophy of mind , mainstream , perception , mind–body problem , reductionism , action (physics) , psychology , neurophilosophy , theory of mind , modality (human–computer interaction) , cognitive psychology , epistemology , mental representation , computer science , neuroscience , philosophy , human–computer interaction , metaphysics , physics , theology , quantum mechanics
Traditional views in philosophy of mind and cognitive science depict the mind as an information processor, one whose connections with the body and the world are of little theoretical importance. On the contrary, mounting empirical evidence shows that bodily states and modality‐specific systems for perception and action underlie information processing, and that embodiment contributes to various aspects and effects of mental phenomena. This article will briefly review and discuss some of this evidence and what it implies. By challenging mainstream accounts of mind and cognition, embodiment views offer new ways of conceptualizing knowledge and suggest novel perspectives on cognitive variation and mind‐body reductionism. WIREs Cogn Sci 2013, 4:319–325. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1226 This article is categorized under: Neuroscience > Cognition