Premium
Tradable instruments to fight climate change: A disappointing outcome
Author(s) -
Quirion Philippe
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
wiley interdisciplinary reviews: climate change
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.678
H-Index - 75
eISSN - 1757-7799
pISSN - 1757-7780
DOI - 10.1002/wcc.705
Subject(s) - renewable energy , work (physics) , emissions trading , outcome (game theory) , climate change , economics , efficient energy use , natural resource economics , climate change mitigation , environmental economics , public economics , business , microeconomics , engineering , mechanical engineering , ecology , electrical engineering , biology
Various tradable instruments have been implemented for climate change mitigation: emission trading systems, tradable energy‐efficiency obligations, and tradable renewable energy quotas. Their track record has been disappointing so far; almost every emission trading has suffered from over‐allocation which has undermined its effectiveness; tradable energy‐efficiency obligations seem to have mostly co‐financed investments that would have taken place anyway; tradable renewable energy quotas suffer from several shortcomings compared to alternative support systems, that is, feed‐in tariffs and premiums. I discuss the reasons for these failures (especially too superficial a reading by policy makers of the work of researchers) and ways to improve the situation (including encouraging systematic syntheses of academic work). This article is categorized under: Climate Economics > Economics of Mitigation