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The politics of climate change in Germany: ambition versus lobby power
Author(s) -
Michaelowa Axel
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
wiley interdisciplinary reviews: climate change
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.678
H-Index - 75
eISSN - 1757-7799
pISSN - 1757-7780
DOI - 10.1002/wcc.224
Subject(s) - climate change , climate governance , renewable energy , tariff , climate change mitigation , carbon tax , natural resource economics , corporate governance , economics , climate policy , politics , policy mix , nuclear power , wind power , emissions trading , economic policy , political science , finance , international economics , macroeconomics , engineering , ecology , law , electrical engineering , biology
In 30 years of climate policy in Germany, a high level of declared ambition has coexisted with an eclectic mix of climate policy measures. Well‐organized lobbies were either exempt from policy instruments such as the energy tax or directly benefitted from them, as in the case of the renewable feed‐in tariff or windfall profits from free allocation of emissions allowances. As a result, German emissions mitigation is much more costly than it would have to be. Moreover, the challenges because of the imminent phase‐out of nuclear power are increasing due to failures in a number of relevant policy fields such as offshore wind, grid reinforcement, and carbon capture and storage ( CCS ). WIREs Clim Change 2013, 4:315–320. doi: 10.1002/wcc.224 This article is categorized under: The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Policies, Instruments, Lifestyles, Behavior Policy and Governance > National Climate Change Policy