Open AccessMetaphysical Vagueness Without Vague Objects
Author(s) -
Abasnezhad Ali,
Jenkins C.S.I.
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
thought: a journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.429
H-Index - 8
ISSN - 2161-2234
DOI - 10.1002/tht3.398
Subject(s) - vagueness , metaphysics , epistemology , indeterminacy (philosophy) , philosophy , legitimacy , abstraction , linguistics , law , politics , political science , fuzzy logic
Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams have developed a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy, via which they defend the theoretical legitimacy of vague objects. In this paper, we argue that while the Barnes–Williams theory supplies a viable account of genuine metaphysical vagueness, it cannot underwrite an account of genuinely vague objects. First we clarify the distinction between these two key theses. Then we argue that the Barnes–Williams theory of metaphysical vagueness not only fails to deliver genuinely vague objects, it in fact provides grounds for rejecting them.