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Simulating institutional controls on consumption patterns in the commons
Author(s) -
Huerta Timothy R.
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
systems research and behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 1092-7026
DOI - 10.1002/sres.922
Subject(s) - commons , consumption (sociology) , sustainability , quality (philosophy) , class (philosophy) , population , public economics , economics , business , microeconomics , computer science , sociology , political science , artificial intelligence , law , ecology , social science , demography , biology , philosophy , epistemology
In 1968, Garrett Hardin identified a class of common goods that suffer under traditional market mechanisms. This paper describes the results of an agent‐based computer simulation used to study how institutional forces shape consumption patterns. Overall, when populations generally act in the common interest, the commons, the population and individuals all experience higher quality outcomes than when they act in generally or exclusively self‐interested ways. The results suggest common‐interested behaviours support a greater population at a higher quality of living; however, exclusively common‐interested behaviours result in underutilized commons, and the whole is generally less well off. The paper frames further applications in terms of managing growth for long‐term sustainability. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.