Premium
The Max‐Min Group Contest: Weakest‐link (Group) All‐Pay Auction
Author(s) -
Chowdhury Subhasish M.,
Lee Dongryul,
Topolyan Iryna
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
southern economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.762
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 2325-8012
pISSN - 0038-4038
DOI - 10.1002/soej.12129
Subject(s) - contest , group (periodic table) , strategy , link (geometry) , mathematical economics , mathematics , economics , combinatorics , game theory , chemistry , political science , organic chemistry , law
We investigate a group all‐pay auction in which each group's effort is represented by the minimum among the effort levels exerted by the group members and the prize is a group‐specific public good. We fully characterize the symmetric equilibria for two groups. There are four types of equilibria: the pure strategy equilibria in which all (active) players exert the same effort; the semi‐pure strategy equilibria in which the players in a group play the same pure strategy whereas those in the other group play the same mixed strategy; the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with continuous support; and the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with discontinuous support. We then analyze a general contest with n groups.