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State bloc versus individual delegate voting at the constitutional convention: Did it make a difference?
Author(s) -
Carlsen Paul D.,
Heckelman Jac C.
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
southern economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.762
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 2325-8012
pISSN - 0038-4038
DOI - 10.1002/soej.12027
Subject(s) - delegate , legislature , voting , convention , constitution , spoilt vote , political science , outcome (game theory) , representation (politics) , contingent vote , state (computer science) , majority rule , law , law and economics , group voting ticket , economics , politics , computer science , mathematical economics , algorithm , programming language
Voting at the 1787 Constitutional Convention followed the procedure of requiring state votes to be determined by the majority vote of each state's present delegates, and the outcome of the vote to be decided by majority vote of the states. In establishing the new legislature, the adopted Constitution set rules such that a simple majority of all present representatives would determine the outcome of each legislative vote. We investigate how Convention vote outcomes might have changed if this voting rule was in place for the Convention. Using spatial models on 398 separate roll calls, we identify which vote outcomes would have differed under individual delegate voting. Analysis suggests only 16 of the vote outcomes would have changed but those that were predicted to change included considering unequal representation in the Senate (i.e., similar to representation in the House) and requiring two‐thirds (rather than three‐fourths) of states to ratify constitutional amendments.