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The problem of unobservables in strategic management research
Author(s) -
Godfrey Paul C.,
Hill Charles W. L.
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
strategic management journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 11.035
H-Index - 286
eISSN - 1097-0266
pISSN - 0143-2095
DOI - 10.1002/smj.4250160703
Subject(s) - unobservable , positivism , agency (philosophy) , transaction cost , positive economics , position (finance) , epistemology , economics , sociology , management science , microeconomics , social science , philosophy , finance
In this paper we argue that unobservable constructs lie at the core of a number of influential theories used in the strategic management literature—including agency theory, transaction cost theory, and the resource‐based view of the firm. The debate over how best to deal with the problem of unobservables has raged in the philosophy of science literature for the best part of the current century. On the one hand, there are the positivists, who believe that theories containing unobservable constructs are only useful as tools for making predictions. According to positivists, such theories do not inform us about the deep structure of reality. On the other hand, there are the realists, who believe that our theories can give us knowledge about unobservables. Herein we review this debate, we argue for adopting a realist position, and we draw out the implications for strategic management research.