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Bureaucracy, economic regulation, and the incentive limits of the firm
Author(s) -
Russo Michael V.
Publication year - 1992
Publication title -
strategic management journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 11.035
H-Index - 286
eISSN - 1097-0266
pISSN - 0143-2095
DOI - 10.1002/smj.4250130203
Subject(s) - subsidiary , bureaucracy , incentive , corporate governance , industrial organization , sample (material) , business , economics , empirical research , organizational economics , economic system , market economy , microeconomics , finance , political science , multinational corporation , politics , philosophy , chemistry , chromatography , epistemology , law
This paper uses a transactions cost perspective to examine the development of organizational tendencies that plague the governance of unregulated subsidiaries by regulated parent companies. By focussing on what Williamson (1985) calls the ‘incentive limits’ of firms, conditions that should exacerbate the problems facing these firms as they diversify are identified. Empirical testing of hypotheses drawn from this discussion is conducted using a sample of nonutility, nonregulated subsidiaries of 54 electric utilities. The analysis, using both linear regression and event history methods, confirms the connection between the characteristics of the regulated parent company and subsidiary performance. The paper concludes with a discussion of how further research might extend the state of knowledge on the topic of the economic losses of bureaucracy.