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Ceo selection, succession, compensation and firm performance: A theoretical integration and empirical analysis
Author(s) -
Zajac Edward J.
Publication year - 1990
Publication title -
strategic management journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 11.035
H-Index - 286
eISSN - 1097-0266
pISSN - 0143-2095
DOI - 10.1002/smj.4250110304
Subject(s) - reinterpretation , linkage (software) , selection (genetic algorithm) , compensation (psychology) , agency (philosophy) , executive compensation , perspective (graphical) , business , set (abstract data type) , relevance (law) , perception , ecological succession , principal–agent problem , succession planning , variation (astronomy) , marketing , industrial organization , management , economics , sociology , political science , psychology , computer science , social psychology , corporate governance , social science , artificial intelligence , law , ecology , chemistry , acoustics , biology , biochemistry , programming language , physics , neuroscience , gene , astrophysics
Abstract This study seeks to extend and unify a set of research issues relating to CEO selection, succession, compensation, and firm performance. The study offers a model of these issues from a combined agency and organizational perspective, and tests the model using archival data and perceptual data from survey responses from 118 CEOs of the largest U.S. corporations. The results suggest that several CEO issues are significant predictors of variation in firm performance, supporting the paper's arguments for (1) a reinterpretation of the insiderfoutsider CEO distinction, (2) the relevance of CEO succession planning, and (3) the importance of CEOs' perceptions of the linkage between their personal wealth and firm wealth.