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Ownership, organization, and private firms' efficient use of resources
Author(s) -
Durand Rodolphe,
Vargas Vicente
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
strategic management journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 11.035
H-Index - 286
eISSN - 1097-0266
pISSN - 0143-2095
DOI - 10.1002/smj.321
Subject(s) - principal (computer security) , business , industrial organization , public ownership , capital (architecture) , test (biology) , economics , market economy , finance , paleontology , archaeology , biology , computer science , history , operating system
The principal–agent theory asserts that public firms' performance is driven by efficient capital and labor markets but is silent about non‐listed private companies, which are less permeable to market forces (both capital and labor) than are public companies. We propose and test a 2 × 2 framework distinguishing owner‐controlled vs. agent‐led firms from firms with a flat vs. multilayer organization. Our findings provide highly contrasted results and raise important issues for further study of private firms. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.