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On the duality of political and economic stakeholder influence on firm innovation performance: T heory and evidence from C hinese firms
Author(s) -
Li Jing,
Xia Jun,
Zajac Edward J.
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
strategic management journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 11.035
H-Index - 286
eISSN - 1097-0266
pISSN - 0143-2095
DOI - 10.1002/smj.2697
Subject(s) - competitor analysis , interdependence , business , industrial organization , politics , stakeholder , government (linguistics) , marketing , dual (grammatical number) , economics , management , art , linguistics , philosophy , literature , political science , law
Research Summary In this study, we propose and test a multi‐stakeholder perspective to address variation in innovation performance across firms. Specifically, we analyze how a focal firm's innovation performance is shaped by its political stakeholders (local and central governments) and economic stakeholders (suppliers, buyers, and competitors). Using a data set consisting of over 26,400 Chinese firms, we first find support for our predictions that a focal firm's innovation performance will be enhanced by both its government connections and the innovativeness of its economic stakeholders. We then analyze whether the interdependent effect of these political and economic stakeholders is more likely to be synergistic versus antagonistic, and find evidence consistent with the antagonistic view. Managerial Summary We show how a firm's innovativeness is influenced strongly by its relationships to external stakeholders. Specifically, we examine the potentially dual‐edged role of political stakeholders (local and central governments) and economic stakeholders (suppliers, buyers, and competitors). Using extensive data on Chinese firms, we find: (a) that the higher the level of government connections, the greater a firm's innovativeness; (b) that firms located in proximity with more innovative economic stakeholders also tend to have higher innovation performance. We also look beyond these independent positive effects to examine the joint effect of these two forms of stakeholder influence, and here we see that more influence is not always better. Specifically, we find that the innovation benefit that typically accrues to firms in proximity to more innovative economic stakeholders is weakened when those firms also have higher‐level government connections.