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A novel comprehensive steganalysis of transmission control protocol/Internet protocol covert channels based on protocol behaviors and support vector machine
Author(s) -
Shen Yao,
Huang Liusheng,
Lu Xiaorong,
Yang Wei
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
security and communication networks
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.446
H-Index - 43
eISSN - 1939-0122
pISSN - 1939-0114
DOI - 10.1002/sec.1081
Subject(s) - header , computer science , steganalysis , covert channel , network packet , rtp control protocol , transmission control protocol , steganography , computer network , protocol (science) , covert , internet protocol , computer security , the internet , artificial intelligence , medicine , alternative medicine , embedding , pathology , world wide web , cloud computing , security information and event management , linguistics , philosophy , cloud computing security , operating system
Abstract Covert channels are malicious conversations disguised in legitimate network communications, allowing information leak to the unauthorized or unknown receiver. Various network steganographic schemes that modify the header fields of transmission control protocol/Internet protocol (TCP/IP) have been proposed in recent years. People before conducted detection research based on the surface content of the header field and did not take into account the differences between the behavior characters of covert channels and the inherent behavior regularities of the header fields. Up to date, there is little comprehensive research on the steganalysis against the storage covert channels. In this paper, we focus on the detection of storage covert channels and introduce a novel comprehensive detection method based on the protocol behaviors. The protocol behavior characters are utilized to evaluate the regularities or correlations of header fields between adjacent packets according to the conventional use. First, the behavior features of the header fields in TCP/IP are extracted; a support vector machine is then applied to the behavior feature sets for discovering the existence of covert channels. Some recognized covert channel tools are detected in our detection experiment. Experimental results and discussion show that our detection method is of effectiveness. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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