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Potential strategies and biosafety protocols used for dual‐use research on highly pathogenic influenza viruses
Author(s) -
Du Lanying,
Li Ye,
Gao Jimin,
Zhou Yusen,
Jiang Shibo
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
reviews in medical virology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.06
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1099-1654
pISSN - 1052-9276
DOI - 10.1002/rmv.1729
Subject(s) - biosafety , biosecurity , influenza a virus subtype h5n1 , pandemic , highly pathogenic , virology , public health , biology , influenza a virus , pandemic influenza , covid-19 , virus , infectious disease (medical specialty) , microbiology and biotechnology , medicine , disease , ecology , nursing , pathology
SUMMARY Influenza A viruses (IAVs), particularly the highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1, have posed a substantial threat to public health worldwide. Although the laboratory generation of the mutant influenza virus H5N1 with airborne transmissibility among mammals, which has been considered as a dual‐use research, may benefit the development of effective vaccines and therapeutics against the emerging infectious agents, it may also pose threats to national biosecurity, laboratory biosafety, and/or public health. This review introduces the classification and characterization of IAVs, pinpoints historic pandemics and epidemics caused by IAVs, emphasizes the significance and necessity of biosafety, summarizes currently established biosafety‐related protocols for IAV research, and provides potential strategies to improve biosafety protocols for dual‐use research on the highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses and other emerging infectious agents. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.