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Oversights and omissions in process hazard analyses: Lessons learned from CSB investigations
Author(s) -
Kaszniak Mark
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
process safety progress
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.378
H-Index - 40
eISSN - 1547-5913
pISSN - 1066-8527
DOI - 10.1002/prs.10373
Subject(s) - hazard , process safety , process (computing) , process safety management , hazardous waste , hazard analysis , risk analysis (engineering) , forensic engineering , engineering , computer science , work in process , business , operations management , reliability engineering , waste management , chemistry , organic chemistry , operating system
Although process hazard analyses have been voluntarily used in the chemical processing industries for over 30 years and required by U.S. regulation for certain processes involving highly hazardous chemicals since the early 1990s, failing to apply or continued misapplication of these techniques allow process hazards to remain either undetected or unappreciated. Using findings from past CSB investigations as examples, this article discusses some problems observed in process hazard analyses that diminished their overall effectiveness and prevented them from fully identifying and/or evaluating process hazards. Some practical solutions are presented for making process hazard analyses more effective. Published 2010 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 2010