An approach to different voting rules from cooperative games with alternatives. Case study: the Catalonia Parliament | Zendy

Carreras Francesc | Zendy; Magaña Antonio | Zendy

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An approach to different voting rules from cooperative games with alternatives. Case study: the Catalonia Parliament

Author(s) -

Carreras Francesc,

Magaña Antonio

Publication year - 2007

Publication title -

pamm

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

ISSN - 1617-7061

DOI - 10.1002/pamm.200700669

Subject(s) - parliament , voting , bullet voting , simple (philosophy) , mathematical economics , cardinal voting systems , anti plurality voting , shapley value , index (typography) , computer science , weighted voting , approval voting , measure (data warehouse) , economics , microeconomics , game theory , political science , law , politics , data mining , philosophy , epistemology , world wide web

We apply simple games with alternatives to describe voting mechanisms used in parliamentary organizations. As a matter of example, we analyze the Catalonia Parliament. Special attention is paid to abstention, which is allowed in most voting rules but is not taken into account when a voting rule is modelled as a simple classical game. To measure the power of each voter in each game, the extended Shapley–Shubik index is considered. (© 2008 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)

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