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An approach to different voting rules from cooperative games with alternatives. Case study: the Catalonia Parliament
Author(s) -
Carreras Francesc,
Magaña Antonio
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
pamm
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1617-7061
DOI - 10.1002/pamm.200700669
Subject(s) - parliament , voting , bullet voting , simple (philosophy) , mathematical economics , cardinal voting systems , anti plurality voting , shapley value , index (typography) , computer science , weighted voting , approval voting , measure (data warehouse) , economics , microeconomics , game theory , political science , law , politics , data mining , philosophy , epistemology , world wide web
Abstract We apply simple games with alternatives to describe voting mechanisms used in parliamentary organizations. As a matter of example, we analyze the Catalonia Parliament. Special attention is paid to abstention, which is allowed in most voting rules but is not taken into account when a voting rule is modelled as a simple classical game. To measure the power of each voter in each game, the extended Shapley–Shubik index is considered. (© 2008 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)