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Deregulatin and the courts
Author(s) -
Sunstein Cass R.
Publication year - 1986
Publication title -
journal of policy analysis and management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.898
H-Index - 84
eISSN - 1520-6688
pISSN - 0276-8739
DOI - 10.1002/pam.4050050307
Subject(s) - deregulation , distrust , statute , executive branch , law , government (linguistics) , political science , judicial review , agency (philosophy) , separation of powers , administrative law , law and economics , legislature , sociology , economics , social science , linguistics , philosophy , macroeconomics
The recent deregulation movement has occupied not only executive agencies and Congress, but the courts as well. Legal challenges to deregulatory measures press traditional doctrines governing judicial review; the traditional role of the courts has been to fend off rather than to help bring about government regulation. These traditions, when joined with contemporary distrust of both regulation and the courts, account for a mounting belief that courts should take a deferential approach to deregulation. But such an approach would be misguided in light of the importance of judicial review in promoting agency adherence to statutes enacted by Congress and in guarding against factional influences over government. Judge‐made doctrines can be developed to make it more likely that deregulation is consistent with law and does not reflect the disproportionate influence of politically powerful groups.