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Economics and politics of deregulation
Author(s) -
Vietor Richard H. K.,
Davidson Dekkers L.
Publication year - 1985
Publication title -
journal of policy analysis and management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.898
H-Index - 84
eISSN - 1520-6688
pISSN - 0276-8739
DOI - 10.1002/pam.4050050101
Subject(s) - competitor analysis , deregulation , commission , politics , opposition (politics) , subsidy , monopoly , principal (computer security) , competition (biology) , economics , business , incentive , market economy , marketing , political science , finance , law , ecology , biology , operating system , computer science
The Access Charge Plan, a marginal‐cost pricing system for long‐distance telephone sewice, was devised by the Federal Communications Commission in 1982 to facilitate the transition from regulated monopoly to competition. In little more than a year after the plan was proposed, as the plan's distributive and competitive impacts were recognized by a host of stakeholders and political interests, a flood of opposition different from the system that had previously existed, nevertheless continued to reflect some of the objectives of the past regime, including subsidies to residential users and some shelter for AT&T's principal competitors. The strength of the political process that produced these modifications was due part to elements in the original FCC proposal that were not essential to its central purpose. swamped the initiative. What emerged, although distinctly different from the system that had previously existed, nevertheless continued to reflect some of the objectives of the past regime, including subsidies to residential users and some shelter for AT&T's principal competitors. The strength of the political process that produced these modifications was due part to elements in the original FCC proposal that were not essential to its central purpose.